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Recent Decisions
CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING-RIGHT TO TRIAL
BY JURY-The New York Court of Appeals has overruled the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, which held that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments require a jury trial in a Family Court
Proceeding charging one with being a juvenile delinquent based on an
act which if committed by an adult would constitute a felony and thus
entitle him to a jury trial.
In Re D., 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, 27 N.Y.2d 90 (1970).
A juvenile, fifteen years of age, was charged with delinquency for hav-
ing intentionally shot and killed his father. The accusation describing
the act stated: "if done by an adult would constitute the crime of
Murder."'
After his arraignment, the youth filed a motion for a jury trial2 which
was denied. Further motions being denied, a conference was held and
the youth was charged with a petition alleging violation of Penal Law
§ 120.25, the old petition being dismissed. Section 120.25, Reckless
Endangerment in the First Degree, has a maximum sentence of seven
years if committed by an adult. The youth admitted this charge, was
adjudged a juvenile delinquent, and committed to an industrial school
for a period not to exceed three years.
Contending he had the constitutional right to trial by jury, the youth
appealed the juvenile court's decision to the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division. In its analysis, the appellate division initially con-
sidered In Re Gault3 which held that a juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing in which a youth was found to have certain constitutional rights
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ap-
pellate court turned to Duncan v. Louisiana4 which held that the Sixth
1. NEw YOasK PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinley 1967).
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) where the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable the Sixth Amendment's require-
ment of right to trial by jury in serious crimes, that the penalty authorized for the
particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious, and a crime
punishable by two years imprisonment was a serious crime. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d
207, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, 247 N.E.2d 260 (1969), the court interpreting Duncan held that the
New York City Criminal Court Act § 40 authorized non-jury trials for misdemeanors
was constitutional. Duncan was subsequently modified by Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1970) which held that "no offense can be deemed petty for purposes of the right to
trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized."
3. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault expressly limited itself to answering the following consti-
tutional questions concerning a juvenile: a) notice of the charges; b) right to counsel;
c) right to confrontation and cross-examination; d) privilege against self-incrimination;
e) right to appellate review; f) right to transcript of the proceedings. It did not consider a
juvenile's right to trial by jury.
4. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, requires a jury trial in a criminal court for all serious offenses,
that the penalty authorized is of major importance in determining
whether or not an offense is serious, and that a crime punishable by
two years imprisonment is serious.
The appellate division felt the instant case was of a serious nature;
the youth was subjected to the loss of his liberty for years, and since
it was serious, certain constitutional "safeguards available to an adult
may not be disregarded in a child's case." 5 For serious crimes, an adult
has the constitutional right to trial by jury and when a youth may be
"found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty for
years"6 the juvenile has the same right to trial by jury.7
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, found:
the civil-criminal distinction between adult crimes and delin-
quency cases is non-existent insofar as a child's constitutional safe-
guards are concerned, particularly where the possible result of
the proceedings is incarceration for a substantial period of time
• . . and the existence of a right is not conditioned on the number
of occasions that it will be put to use or the persons who will use it.8
In overruling the appellate division, the New York Court of Appeals
stated: "trial by jury in cases involving juvenile delinquents is neither
constitutionally required nor desirable and would inevitably bring a
good deal more formality to the juvenile court without giving the
youngster a demonstrably better fact-finding process than trial before
a judge."9 This decision has been appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court.
Relying on Kent v. United States,'0 Gault," and the concurring
opinion in In Re Winship,'2 the court felt the Kent decision did not
require the juvenile delinquency proceeding to conform with all the
requirements of a criminal trial, only due process and fair treatment.
In Gault, the United States Supreme Court had not expressed an
opinion on the other due process requirements. Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Winship emphasized the position that proof beyond
5. In Re D., 310 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 34 A.D.2d at -.
6. 387 U.S. at 36.
7. 310 N.Y.S.2d at 89, 34 App. Div. at -.
8. Id. at 88-89, 34 A.D.2d at -
9. 313 N.Y.S.2d at 707, 27 N.Y.2d at 95, 261 N.E.2d at 630.
10. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
11. See note 3.
12. 897 U.S. 375 (1970).
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a reasonable doubt in a juvenile delinquency proceeding would not
interfere with the goal of rehabilitation, stigmatize the youth as a
criminal, nor:
Burden the juvenile courts with a procedural requirement which
would make juvenile adjudications significantly more time con-
suming or rigid. (Emphasis New York Court of Appeals).
Therefore we see no compelling reason why we should burden the
court with a procedural requirement which would make such ad-
judications significantly time consuming, cumbersome, and result
in a loss of secrecy which has always been deemed most desirable,
since a jury trial would not necessarily afford the youngster a better
fact-finding process.13
The establishment of separate courts for juvenile offenders origin-
ated in this country at the beginning of the 20th century. The first
juvenile court was established by Illinois in 189914 and similar courts
were subsequently created by other state legislatures. No juvenile de-
linquency act required a jury trial and this was not considered a depri-
vation of the youth's constitutional right; jury trials were deemed
inapplicable to these proceedings. These courts were not considered
criminal courts; nor were the acts of the youthful offenders considered
to be crimes; rather, it was a proceeding to determine "whether the
interests of the state and the child demanded that the guardianship of
the state should be substituted for that of the natural parent ' 15 under
the doctrine of parens patriae. The acts creating these juvenile courts
were held to be constitutional.16
For approximately fifty years only a minority of courts questioned
the youth's constitutional rights in juvenile proceedings.' 7 Finally in
Haley v. Ohio,'8 Justice Douglas speaking for four Justices stated:
"[n]either man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by meth-
ods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law."19
13. 313 N.Y.S.2d at 708, 27 N.Y.2d at 95, 261 N.E.2d at 629.
14. Act of 1899 also known as the Juvenile Court Act of Illinois.
15. See: People ex rel. Sanfilippo v. New York Catholic Protectory, 38 Misc. 660, 78
N.Y. Supp. 232 (1902); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905); In Re
Gassaway, 70 Kan. 695, 79 P. 113 (1905); Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 45 So. 49 (1907);
In Re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 98 P. 563 (1908); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E.
892 (1913).
16. See Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907); Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 142
Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911); Leonard v. Licker, 3 Ohio App. 377 (1914); Commonwealth
v. Carnes, 82 Pa. Super. 335 (1923).
17. See generally People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927); People v.
Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So.2d 211 (1943).
18. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
19. Id. at 601.
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After this decision, courts began to inquire into the nature of the juve-
nile court proceedings.20 These proceedings now were found to be
quasi-criminal in nature21 and the power of the state under the doctrine
of parens patriae was not unlimited. 2 The informality of the proceed-
ings was also questioned.2
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court in Gault24 held that the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause required certain constitu-
tional safeguards in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. However, trial
by jury was not considered by the Gault Court.
The majority of state courts have continued to hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not require a trial by jury in a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding.2 5 Gault is read narrowly; it does not require
juveniles to be treated as adults. While courts must operate within the
constitutional guarantees of due process, it is necessary they retain their
flexible procedures and techniques. Conversely, a minority has found
the right to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings implicit in the Gault
decision. 26
After the Duncan decision, the United States Supreme Court de-
clined in In Re Whittington27 to answer the question whether the
Federal Constitution requires the states to grant jury trials in juvenile
court proceedings. Similarly, in DeBacker v. Brainard2 8 the Supreme
Court declined to answer the question whether a Nebraska statute
29
providing that juvenile hearings were to be without jury was constitu-
tional since the juvenile was found to be delinquent prior to Duncan.
Dissenting, Justices Douglas and Black, found the statute unconstitu-
20. In Re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952); Holme's Appeal, 109
A.2d 523 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
21. In Re Gregory W. and Gerald S., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966).
22. 383 U.S. at 555. Kent also emphasized the necessity that the basic requirements of
due process and fairness be satisfied in such proceedings.
23. See note 21; Equal Rights-For Whom?: Address by Justice Abe Fortas, 8th
Annual James Madison Lecture, March 29, 1967, 42 N.Y.U.L.R. 401 (1967); Lehman, J.,
A Juvenile's Right to Counsel in a Delinquency Hearing. 17 JUVENILE COURT JUDGE'S
JOURNAL 53 (1966).
24. See note 3.
25. Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 272, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967).
26. Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968); In Re Rindell, 2 BNA CR. L.
3121 (Providence RI. Family Ct. Jan. 1968); Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994
(1968).
27. 391 U.S. 342 (1968).
28. 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
29. "Four of the seven justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court thought the Nebraska
statutory provisions which require that juvenile hearings be without a jury, Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-206.03(2) were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Constitution provides, however,
that "No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of
five judges." NEB. CoNsT., Art. V, § 2; 396 U.S. at 29 n.3.
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tional: "[g]iven the fundamental nature of the right to jury trial as
expressed in Duncan, there is no constitutionally sufficient reason to
deprive the juvenile of this right."30
In Winship,31 the last decision of the Supreme Court regarding juve-
nile rights, it was held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required
to establish guilt in a juvenile court of a criminal charge and is as much
required during the adjudicatory phase of the hearing as the other
constitutional safeguards expressed in Gault. Citing Gault, the court
felt civil labels and good intentions do not obviate the need for criminal
due process safeguards in juvenile courts:
Due process commands that a juvenile shall not lose his liberty
unless the proof is such to convict him were he an adult. Nor
would proof beyond a reasonable doubt destroy the beneficial
aspects of the juvenile process such as the informality, flexibility,
or speed of the hearing at which the factfinding takes place . 2
As in Gault, Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, limited the
Winship decision, refusing to answer if other elements of due process
and fair treatment were required in the adjudicatory phase of a delin-
quency proceeding.
Since the Duncan decision in 1968, numerous state courts have held
the right to trial by jury is not required in a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding. In Dryden v. Commonwealth,33 one of the earliest decisions,
the Kentucky court stated:
A trial by jury, with all the clash and clamor of the adversary sys-
tem that necessarily goes with it, would certainly invest a juvenile
proceeding with the appearance of a criminal trial, and create in
the mind and memory of the child the same effect as if it were.
Certainly we cannot regard a jury as a better, fairer, more accurate
fact-finder than a competent and conscientious circuit judge. In
our opinion there is more to be lost than gained.34
In Re Turner35 expressed the viewpoint:
The ultimate question is not one of guilt or innocence but rather
what will best serve the interests of the child. We recognize the
distinction between the adjudicative phase of a juvenile case and
the dispositional phase. There is reason to believe, however, that,
.30. Id. at 38.
31. See note 12.
32. Id. at 366.
33. 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968).
34. Id. at 461.
35. 453 P.2d 910 (Or. 1969); see also In Re Fucini, 44 IM. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
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at least in cases of first offenders and of other children who have
not yet embarked upon a criminal career, the adjudicative phase
of their court experience represents an important rehabilitative
opportunity."6
Likewise in In Re Agler T the Ohio court felt a juvenile could derive
no benefit from a jury trial worthy of destroying his special status, and
therefore, trial by jury was not an essential element in the adjudicative
phase of a proceeding and was neither required by the Constitution nor
sound public policy.
The United States Supreme Court has recently heard arguments by
states denying jury trials for a youth in a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding: In Re Burrus38 where the North Carolina court held that a
juvenile proceeding is neither a criminal prosecution nor penal in
character and the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury has no appli-
cation to a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act; and In Re Mc-
Keivers9 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a jury trial
is less essential and not so fundamental in a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding when it operates in the context of all the other constitutional
safeguards. (Emphasis Pennsylvania Supreme Court). In McKeiver, the
court felt there were four reasons why a trial by jury is less essential in
a juvenile court proceeding and not constitutionally required: 1.)
judges in juvenile courts see their role differently than their counter-
parts in criminal courts; 2.) the juvenile court system more fully utilizes
various rehabilitative techniques; 3.) a declaration of juvenile delin-
quency is less onerous than a finding of criminal guilt; and 4.) a jury
trial in a juvenile court proceeding would most disrupt the traditional
character of the juvenile court system.
For three years the United States Supreme Court has delayed an-
swering whether a jury trial is required in a juvenile proceeding. Since
it has heard arguments in the Burrus and McKeiver cases, there is
reason to believe the Supreme Court will now resolve the question.
If the Supreme Court decides it is unconstitutional to deny a youth
a jury trial in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, it will probably cite
36. 453 P.2d at 912-914.
37. 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); see also In Re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255
A.2d 419 (1969); in Re Wichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 174 S.E.2d 281 (1970).
38. 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969) prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 1036, oral arguments
before Supreme Court 12/9-10/70, 8 BNA Ct. L. 4088, No. 128.
39. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970) prob. juris. noted, 90 S.Ct. 2271, oral arguments
before Supreme Court 12/10/70, 8 BNA CL_ L. 4090, No. 322.
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the late Justice Musmanno's dissent in Holme's Appeal4 as in Gault.
One complaint of the Holme's dissent remains:
Are children entitled to the protection of the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1 § 9 of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania?41
It is submitted the Supreme Court will answer this question affirma-
tively and declare it unconstitutional to deny a youth a jury trial in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding when he is charged with an offense
which if committed by an adult would entitle the adult to trial by
jury.
Every juvenile delinquency proceeding has two phases: the adjudica-
tive phase where it is determined if the youth is a juvenile delinquent;
and the dispositional phase where it is decided what type of rehabilita-
tion will best serve the interests of the child and the state. Today, the
majority of state courts believe the rehabilitative phase requires a re-
laxation of formalities in the adjudicative phase to achieve the greatest
correctional effect; the adjudicative phase is considered part of the
rehabilitative process. 42 A minority feel that rehabilitation is restricted
to the dispositional phase and any rehabilitation achieved in the ad-
judicative phase cannot be balanced against the resulting loss of a
youth's constitutional right to trial by jury.43 In Holme's Appeal,
Justice Musmanno stated:
The question is not how Joseph Holmes should be treated, but
whether he should be "treated" at all. Fairness and justice certainly
recognize that a child has the right not to be a ward of the State,
not to be committed to a reformatory, not to be deprived of his
liberty, if he is innocent. (Emphasis Justice Musmanno.)"
Though the courts have recognized these two phases, the present con-
stitutional controversy has arisen because they have not divorced the
adjudicative phase-whether the youth is a juvenile delinquent-with
the dispositional phase-the rehabilitation the youth will receive if
found delinquent. The preferential treatment received by the youth
40. 109 A.2d 523.
41. Id. at 533.
42. See generally Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In Re Turner.
453 P.2d 910 (Or. 1969); In Re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); In Re
Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
43. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (1968); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437
P.2d 716 (1968).
44. 109 A.2d at 528.
687
Duquesne Law Review
in the dispositional stage has been applied in the adjudicative stage,
the result being a denial of the youth's constitutional rights. As Justice
Musmanno stated in Holme's Appeal:
If we were to accept the utterly illogical proposition that a child is
better guarded by denying him the security of the above-mentioned
constitutional guarantees, why shouldn't we then throw the same
defensive armor around women who are invariably regarded as
being less able to fend for themselves than men? And if the extrava-
gant supposition is accepted that children and women are in a
superior position of vantage outside the Constitution, why not
turn out of the State's tabernacle of inalienable rights the crippled,
the mutilated, the aged and the blind? Certainly they are entitled
to the same privileges which go to helpless children and women.
(Emphasis Justice Musmanno.)45
The adjudicative phase ". . . is a trial . . .,4 regardless of the
nametag stamped upon the proceedings by the legislature. Governed
at times by a "calloused ' 47 judge, due process is sometimes disregarded.
The juvenile court judge "carries no magical fishing rod to draw forth
the truth out of a confused sea of speculation, rumor, suspicion and
hearsay.148 "The factfinder will despite its best efforts sometimes . . .
be wrong ... there is always in litigation a margin of error. a49 This
margin of error is substantially increased when the trier is a judge,
despite his years of experience and judicial expertise. Trial by jury
increases the probability one juror may not be convinced beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. And it is this likelihood that a single juror may not be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt which the Constitution demands
for the hardened criminal but which the state denies a youthful of-
fender. As the late Justice Cohen stated in his dissent in In Re Mc-
Keiver:
Informality and flexibility are not ends in themselves; the purpose
of the adjudicatory stage is to determine whether the defendant is
delinquent and some loss of informality and flexibility will not
have a great effect on whatever rehabilitation the juvenile system
can accomplish. 50
Though some argue a juvenile delinquency proceeding protects the
45. Id. at 533.
46. Id. at 529.
47. Id. at 530.
48. Id. at 529.
49. 397 U.S. at 372.
50. 438 Pa. at 354, 265 A.2d at 357.
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youth from the ordeal of trial, the ordeal of trial is no more exasperat:
ing to the youthful offender than commitment behind a barbed fence.
The Sixth Amendment is not concerned with informality; nor with
flexibility; rather, it requires a jury trial for all and it does not exclude
children. Constitutional rights cannot be balanced upon a scale of
flexibility and informality-they are too few and too precious. As Jus-
tice Musmanno stated in Holme's Appeal:
What a child charged with crime is entitled to, is justice, not parens
patriae . . . (Emphasis Justice Musmanno.)51
Joseph E. Vogrin, III
JUVENILES-ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY-MAXIMUM SENTENCES-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a juvenile may be
sentenced to a longer maximum commitment than an adult tried for
the same crime if the following conditions are present: 1.) the juvenile
is notified at the outset of the proceedings of all factors upon which the
state proposes to base the adjudication; 2.) the facts supporting the
ultimate conclusions must be clearly found and set forth; and, 3.) it
must be clear that during the longer commitment the juvenile will
receive appropriate rehabilitative care.
Wilson Appeal, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970).
On June 2, 1968, Charles Laverne Wilson and several other youths
became involved in an interracial street fight in Lancaster, Pennsyl-
vania. Although no one was seriously injured in the fray, and Wilson's
involvement was confined to throwing a few punches, juvenile delin-
quency proceedings were subsequently brought against him.
During the delinquency hearing, the judge considered not only the
street fight incident, but also Wilson's prior school suspension and
burglary conviction as significant factors in finding him a delinquent.
Neither Wilson's counsel nor his parents had any notice that these two
additional factors would be considered in this hearing.
Wilson was adjudged a delinquent and was sentenced to the State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.1 His sentence,
51. 109 A.2d at 530.
1. 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970).
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